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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN J. STAKER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
HUNTINGTON CLEVELAND 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 18203 
This is an action commenced by plaintiff on March 27, 1979, 
against defendant to secure payment of the total sum of $5,031.50 
together with interest from the defendant Irrigation Company on 
account of alleged overpayments made by plaintiff to defendant 
of amounts paid on an alleged water subscription from August 1, 
1966 through May 1, 1969 for the Joe's Valley Project. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's substitute attorney (TR 3) retained two days 
earlier filed in open Court a motion to amend the pleadings on 
the date of trial, November 6, 1981, pursuant to Rule 15(a) (TR 3). 
Defendant's substitute attorney, the day before trial, informed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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plaintiff's attorney he would raise the defense of statute of 
limitations (TR 4). The Court stated the motion would prejudice 
the plaintiff (TR 4), took the motion under advisement (TR 8) and 
proceeded to try the case. Immediately after the case was con-
cluded the Court denied defendant's motion to amend the pleadings 
to raise the defense of the statute of limitations (TR 142). On 
December 10, 1981, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks dismissal of the trial court's 
judgment and an Order that defendant's motion to amend to plead 
the statute of limitations as a defense be granted. 
In the alternative, defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
awarding plaintiff interest in the sum of $3,283.00 reducing said 
judgment to the sum of $5,031.50. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff brought suit to secure payment of the total sum of 
$5,031.50 from the defendant irrigation company on account of 
alleged overpayments by plaintiff to defendant of amounts due on 
a water subscription: 
8/ 1/66 Overpayment on subscription 
1/11/67 $1.55 on 1,110 acre feet 
2/29/68 
5/12/69 
$1.55 on 1,110 acre feet 
$1.55 on 310 acre feet 
- 2 -
$1,110.00 
$1,720.50 
$1,720.50 
480.50 
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together with interest on said sum. 
On March 1, 1975, more than 5 years after the last payment on 
the alleged subscriptions, plaintiff filed a written demand with 
defendant (P. Exh. 17, TR 35). 
On March 27, 1979, plaintiff filed his complaint. Defendant's 
answer was filed on April 11, 1979, by Thomas o. Parker, its attorney 
of record. 
The Notice of Trial Setting of February 18, 1981 and the notice 
of Trial Setting of May 5, 1981, was sent to E. J. Skeen, 536 E. 
4th S., Salt Lake City, Utah, not to Thomas o. Parker, defendant's 
attorney of record. 
On November 5, 1981, the day before trial, defendant's substi-
tute attorney, s. v. Litizzette, notified plaintiff's attorney that 
he would move to amend the Answer to include the defense of the 
statute of limitations (TR 3). 
On the day of trial, November 6, 1981, by motion to amend, 
defendant's substitute attorney raised the defense of the statute 
of limitations pursuant to Rule 15 (a) -U. R.C. P. (TR 3) 
Plaintiff's attorney resisted the motion to amend claiming 
prejudice (TR 5). 
The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the 
plaintiff to proceed to try the case (TR 8). 
At the conclusion, after both sides had rested, the Court 
- 3 -
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denied defendant's motion to raise the defense of the statute of 
limitations (TR 142) and took the matter under advisement (TR 145). 
On December 10, 1981, the court entered judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $5,031.50 together with interest in the 
sum of $3,283.00 making a total judgment of $8,344.25. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
SUBSTITUTE ATTORNEY'S MOTION MADE ON THE DAY OF TRIAL TO 
AMEND THE ANSWER TO SET UP THE BAR OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION~ 
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is Section 
78-12-25 u.c.A. which provides that an action upon a contract, 
obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument must be 
commenced within 4 years ... Pursuant to this Section the plain-
tiff's right of action was barred on May 12, 1973, 4 years from 
the date of the last alleged overpayment. 
The applicable rule concerning the pleading of the statute 
of limitations as an affirmative defense is Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P. 
The applicable rule governing when pleadings can be amended 
is Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P., which provides that a party may amend his 
pleadings only by leave of Court or by written consent of the ad-
verse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so require~ 
- 4 -
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The issue is whether under Rule lS(a) the lower court abused 
its discretion in denying a substitute attorney's motion to amend 
to plead the bar of the statute of limitations on the day of trial. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued that to allow the amendment would 
be prejudicial to plaintiff (TR 5) citing Goeltz v. Continental 
Bank and Trust, 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832, in support. 
In Goeltz, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Statutes of limitations as statutes of repose have a useful 
function in our law system. Sometimes they prevent the pros-
ecution of a stale claim after proof of the facts are un-
available, and in such a case the interests of justice would 
require that leave to amend be freely granted. In other cases 
such defense merely prevents a recovery of a just claim. Except 
against the estate of a deceased person such defense may always 
be waived. Here defendant seeks leave to amend after all the 
evidence is in, (emphasis added) ... " 
Preliminarily the court observed that on p. 206 of the Goeltz 
decision the defendant asked leave to amend after all of the evidence 
was in (TR p. 6 L. 7-si 
Plaintiff's counsel and the court made the following statements: 
"MR. McIFF: That is correct. 
THE COURT: So that is not our case here today. (Emphasis added; 
MR. McIFF: No, it is not. I agree with that yourHonor. But 
the basic thrust of what the Court said here was 
that the statute of limitations is a technical 
defense and prevents the matter being adjudicated 
on the merits." (TR p. 6, L. 9-14) 
The court took defendant's motion under advisement and proceeded 
to try the case (TR 8). 
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At the conclusion of the trial the court denied defendant's 
motion to amend (TR 142) and stated: 
"THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, first of all, just let me state 
that during the noon recess I had an opportunity to go through 
the Goeltz versus Continental Bank and Trust case relative to 
the question of filing this motion to amend to include the 
defense of statute of limitations -- to review that case and 
the couple of cases that Mr. Mciff presented to the Court. 
And I haveconcludedthat within the reasoning of that case, 
that the amendment should not be allowed at this late date; 
in that if there were some substantial rights that the defen-
dant wanted at this time to bring in because of the statute 
of limitations, then we would allow it. But where it is upon 
purely as a technical defense, and where it seems that most 
of the material issues in this case have been brought before 
the Court, it just doesn't appear that that technical defense 
should be imposed because it is strictly in the nature of a 
technical defense. So the Court in accordance with the rul-
ing of that case, we'll deny the motion to file the amended 
answer at this late date. This case has been set, I believe, 
twice before •.. " (TR 142) 
Apparently, the court concluded Goeltz controlled and was 
authority for the proposition that on the day of trial defendant's 
substitute attorney of ~ days could not move to amend to plead the 
bar of the statute of limitations. 
The facts in this case fall into the category of cases wherein 
the fact that failure to plead the statute of limitations in the 
original pleadings was due to oversight, negligence or ignorance 
of counsel. The following cases are cited in 59 A.L.R. 2d §6 p. 194, 
et seq. as representative of fact situations which were held to 
justify or require a trial court's allowance of an amendment assert-
ing the defense of the statute of limitations. 
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Illinois Steel v. Budzisz, (1900) 106 Wis. 499 NW, where 3 days 
after the substitution of a new attorney, on the day of trial there 
was no abuse of discretion in granting amendment to plead the bar of 
the statute of limitations. 
Santiago v. Amangual, (1914) 7 Puerto Rico F 308, where defen-
dant's motion for leave to amend to plead the statute of limitations 
was made 2 days before the case was set for trial. 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Denver, (1931) 90 Colo 20, 6 P2d 6, 
where defendant's motion to plead the statute of limitations was 
made 5 days before trial, particularly see 
Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., (1956) 229 F2d 714, 
where defendant's motion for leave to amend to plead the statute of 
limitations was allowed at the second trial after reversal of the 
first trial. In Emich the Court stated: 
"In the instant case defendants pleaded the statute of 
limitations below after the case was remanded for a new 
trial, a remand made necessary by prejudicial errors 
which occurred in the first trial, errors for which 
the plaintiffs must bear at least part of the responsibility. 
Rule 15(a) does not distinguish between amendments after 
appeal and remand and those before appeal. Nor do the deci-
sions make such a distinction. Bowles v. Biberman Bros., 3 
Cir., 152 F.2d 700; Guth v. Texas Co., 7 Cir. 155 F.2d 563. 
Emich followed in Greninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (1966) 
Similarly in Romo v. Reyes, (1976) 26 Ariz App. 374, 548 P.2d 
1186, where the Court held an answer may be amended at any time 
- 7 -
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before trial. In this case the court stated: 
"[4,5] Respondent maintains, of course, that he will indeed 
be prejudiced by allowing an amendment since his claim will 
be barred by the two-year statute of limitations. We have 
said that even where a party is prejudiced, the prejudice 
must be balanced against the hardship to the moving party 
if leave to amend is denied. Green Reservoir Flood Control 
Dist. v. Willmoth, 15 Ariz App. 406, 489 P.2d 69 (1971) ." 
Romo followed in Trujillo v. Brasfield, (1978) Ariz App. 579 
P.2d 46. In Trujillo the Court stated: 
"The respondents argue that even though Rule 15(a), 
Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., states 
that 'Leave to amend shall be freely given when justice 
requires.' to do so in this case would burden them with 
undue prejudice and cause the action to be decided on a 
technicality, rather than on the merits. The respondents 
have failed to deal with the case of Romo v. Reyes, 26 
Ariz App. 374, 548 P.2d 1186 (1976), cited by the petition-
ers, which effectively destroys their argument." 
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that, the trial 
court abused its discretion and should have allowed defendant's 
substitute attorney to plead the bar of the statute of limitations. 
Goeltz does not apply since defendant's motion to amend was timely 
made before any evidence had been introduced. Pursuant to Rule lS(a) 
defendant's motion to amend should have been freely granted. 
The judgment of the trial court is therefore erroneous and 
must be reversed. 
- 8 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN THAT 
COURT DID NOT PROPERLY NOTICE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY OF RECORD 
OF THE DATE OF TRIAL. 
The applicable rule governing Notice of Trial is Rule 4.1 of 
the Rules of Practice in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of 
the state of Utah. 
Rule 4.l(a) states: 
"Upon oral or written stipulation or order of the court, a 
trial date may be obtained at any time and shall be set at 
a date that the convenience of the calendar may allow. Notice 
of the trial date shall be mailed by the clerk of the court 
to all counsel of record (emphasis added) or the parties who 
are not represented by counsel of record, advising them of 
said date and a copy of the notice shall be filed. Once 
cases have been set for trial, continuances will be granted 
only in accordance with these rules." 
In the instant case two notices of trial setting were not sent 
to Thomas O. Parker, the attorney of record. The failure of the 
Court to give proper notice of trial was discovered by defendant's 
substitute attorney in preparing the Docketing Statement required 
by this appeal. 
75 Am Jur 2d §6 p. 123 states: 
"While practice statutes, rules of practice, or rules of court 
frequently require the giving of notice of trial, in the absence 
of the statute or rule, it is not necessary to give a party 
litigant notice, since it is up to the litigant to keep him-
self apprised of the time the case is set for trial. When 
such notice is required by statute or rule, defendants who 
have entered a general appearance are entitled to be notified, 
in person or through their counsel, of any hearing wher~ evi-
dence will be taken on the merits of the case." (Emphasis added) 
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Hawkins v. Aldridge, 211 Ind. 332 7 NE 2d 34. 
See also the cases cited in 109 A.L.R. 1205. For the reasons 
set forth above the judgment should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S SUBSTITUTE ATTORNEY'S MOTION TO RAISE 
THE BAR OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THE PLAINTIFF IS noT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW ENTITLED TO INTEREST. 
There is no statute or rule relating to pre-judgment interest 
under the facts of this case. 
Rule 54(e) governs interest on any verdict or decision from 
the time it was rendered but here the court awarded plaintiff in-
terest in the sum of $3,283.00 from and after January 1, 1973 to 
November 16, 1981. (See paragraph 2 of the Judgment) 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the transcript regarding 
pre-judgment interest. 
There being no evidence the only grounds for awarding interest 
to plaintiff would appear to be that the court concluded plaintiff 
was entitled to interest as a matter of law. (Emphasis added) 
In 22 Am Jur 2d §179 it is stated: 
"Interest by way of damages has been defined as interest 
allowed in actions for breach of contract or tort for the 
unlawful detention of money found to be due. This type 
- 10 -
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of interest is frequently called 'moratory interest.' Inter-
est, as a part of damages, is allowed, not by application of 
arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice of the in-
dividual case and as compensation to the injured party." 
See Farnsworth v. Jensen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 531, where 
the contract for the purchase of land provided for payment of 
interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 
See also, L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Const. Co., Inc., 
· Utah, 608 P. 2d 626. 
In 22 Am Jur 2d §183 p. 261 it is stated: 
"In contract actions a distinction is often drawn between 
liquidated and unliquidated claims, interest being allowed 
as of right in the former and either denied or allowed 
only in the discretion of the court in the latter." 
In 22 Am Jur 2d §182 p. 260 it is stated: 
"Recent cases, however, approach the problem in a more 
direct fashion and allow interest on an unliquidated 
claim when justice and fairness so require." 
It is submitted that in the instant case the allowance of 
interest to plaintiff would not be in the interest of justice and 
fairness. 
Here the amounts allegedly due plaintiff were paid for the 
period from 8/1/66 through 5/12/69 (P. Exh. 17, TR 35). The Court 
allowed plaintiff interest from January 1, 1973 to November 16, 1981, 
a period of 8 years and 11 months, almost 9 years. 
- 11 -
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In 51 Am Jur 2d §24 p. 608 it is stated: 
"If the obligation to pay interest is merely incidental to the 
principal obligation, forming a part of the contract governing 
that obligation, the bar of the statute of limitations upon 
the right to recover the principal also bars the right to 
recover interest, although the interest claimed accrued within 
the statutory period." 
See Annotation: 115 ALR 728, 729. 
For the foregoing reasons, in the alternative, this case should 
be reversed in part. Plaintiff should be awarded only the principal 
amount claimed from defendant in the sum of $5,031.50. (See para-
graph 1 of the judgment) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's 
substitute attorney's motion to plead the bar of the statute of 
limitations. 
The court's failure to give proper notice to the attorney of 
record is an added reason to reverse the judgment of the lower court 
In the alternative, however, if the court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's substitute attorney's motion 
to raise the bar of the statute of limitations the plaintiff is 
not entitled to interest and the lower court's judgment should be 
entered against defendant only in the sum of $5,031.50 the principal 
amount claimed by plaintiff. 
- 12 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 1982, 
---
rf1 
,-;: r -
,,.,,..~ - I 
I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
K. L. Mciff 
JACKSON, McIFF & MOWER 
151 North Main Street 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Attorney for Plainti~f-Respondent 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
